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“I am urging every teacher education program 
today to make better outcomes for students 
the overarching mission that propels all their 
efforts.” 
--Secretary of Education Arne Duncan, 2009 
At first blush, Secretary Duncan’s call to strengthen teacher education 
programs appears irrefutable; what can be wrong with better outcomes for 
students?  As Duncan attests, today’s teachers are burdened with more demands 
than any others in the past: while dealing with larger and ever more diverse 
populations of students, teachers are simultaneously asked to “achieve significant 
academic growth for all students” (Duncan). No Child Left Behind, with its 
emphasis on high-stakes tests, is drawing closer to its terminal year. However, 
President Obama administration’s Race to the Top initiative, which asks states to 
make significant reforms in order to gain federal funds, suggests that the 
government will continue to support those states that show significant gains in test 
scores. Teachers will be expected to help students reach increasingly advanced 
benchmarks. Indeed, when the first Race to the Top winners were recently 
announced, only two states came out with passing grades, suggesting that most 
states were not even close to meeting the Education Department’s rigorous 
standards (Colvin). Such standards – whether for schools, state governments, or 
teacher training programs – are laudable, and certainly, educators at all levels 
should be asked to achieve high benchmarks.  
At the same time, Duncan’s plea implies that “better outcomes” are not the 
current “overarching mission” of teacher education programs – that student 
learning and achievement are not the impetus behind hundreds of schools of 
education across the country (Duncan). Duncan does not specify what current 
programs focus on at the expense of student learning. But his ideas for 
improvement – which center on more rigorous training in the content areas and 
increased opportunities for hands-on experience in the classroom – imply that 
 programs currently forgo such training in favor of “subjective, obscure, faddish… 
out of touch [and] politically correct” pedagogical indoctrination (Levine qtd. in 
Duncan). Rather than student learning, Duncan suggests, teacher-training programs 
emphasize lock-step politics and poorly researched educational trends.  
The problem with such a statement, however, is that Duncan himself is 
petitioning for a specific political agenda (couched in the speciously objective 
terms of “student learning” and “achievement”) and asking schools of education to 
conform to it. In fact, though, in order to avoid faddish curriculum and unburden 
themselves of their lackluster reputations, education programs must continue to 
provide their students with theoretical, historical, and philosophical understandings 
of education – the very concepts that Duncan dismisses as “obscure” and “out of 
touch.” Although Duncan presumably wishes to prioritize content knowledge and 
practical skills over educational theories and philosophies, these subjects are 
essential aspects of any program that wishes to facilitate the growth of effective 
and thoughtful educators – and, by extension, truly educated children. Duncan’s 
suggested reforms point to important potential flaws in teacher education 
programs; at the same time, it is important to recognize, in a way that Duncan does 
not, what does work about current programs in the academy.  
Certainly, Duncan is not wrong to advocate for content knowledge and 
rigorous practical training. Many educational thinkers have called for similar 
reforms in teacher training programs, based on their belief that teachers are not as 
liberally educated as they need to be in order to efficiently transmit cultural and 
academic information to their students. For instance, Duncan actually refers in his 
speech to E.D. Hirsch, whom he calls the “father of the acclaimed, content-rich 
Core Knowledge Program.” Hirsch has been a long-time advocate for increased 
academic rigor in schools. Hirsch sees effective student learning as the successful 
acquisition of basic skills and culturally relevant information. He has said that “the 
names, phrases, events, and other items that are familiar to most literate American” 
create a body of information whose importance is “beyond question” (Hirsch x). 
As a result, teachers need to be experts in their disciplines, so they can effectively 
provide their students with this essential information. On his Core Knowledge 
website, in fact, Hirsch suggests a possible curriculum for pre-service elementary 
school teachers. The requirements include classes in a range of subjects, from 
chemistry to literature, and exactly one pedagogical course: Teaching Reading. 
Given Hirsch’s suggestions for teacher education, he would undoubtedly support 
Duncan’s call for more rigorous disciplinary education for teachers.  
Mortimer Adler, an educational leader who pioneered the intellectually 
rigorous “Great Books” programs in schools, has also written in favor of content-
area focus in teacher preparation programs. Pre-service teachers, he says, need a 
“course of study that is general, liberal, and humanistic” (Adler 59). He goes on to 
 explain that current programs “turn out students who are not sufficiently equipped 
with the knowledge” necessary in order to successfully teach students what they 
need to know (Adler 60). At the same time, Adler also argues that teachers need to 
be familiar with several types of teaching methodologies, depending on whether 
they are explaining facts, facilitating skill-development, or encouraging critical 
thinking. Thus, as Duncan proposes, pre-service teachers need practical 
experience. Teachers need “practice under supervision… [and not the] lecture 
courses in pedagogy and teaching methods such as are now taught in most schools” 
(Adler 61). They need practical expertise in the didactic, coaching, and questioning 
methods that are needed for each kind of learning. Thus, while Adler emphasizes 
the importance of content knowledge, he also acknowledges that teaching well 
requires a deep understanding of how to teach as well as the content to be taught. 
Duncan’s call for increased practical experience could provide what Adler 
considers the necessary exposure to the different teaching methodologies. Adler 
and Hirsch would both agree that schools of education need more rigorous content-
area requirements and increased hands-on experience; indeed, few philosophers 
could argue with the importance of developing these skills in teachers.   
Yet Duncan also makes clear his desire to analyze teacher education 
programs based on student performance on standardized tests. Duncan states 
explicitly that the Department of Education will reward and encourage those 
colleges that “use data, including student achievement data, to foster an ethic of 
continuous achievement.”  Student achievement data will almost certainly mean 
standardized test scores. Because Duncan wants to be able to compare students, he 
must define progress as something distinctly measurable. Therefore, it seems clear 
that schools and states will continue to measure “progress” by examining scores on 
standardized tests – how else but by a numerical representation can students across 
the country be easily compared? Thus, although Duncan claims he is supporting 
“student learning” in favor of “faddish” politics, he is actually supporting the 
continued use of standardized testing to measure progress and determine the 
effectiveness of a child’s education (this in itself is a “faddish” decision, or, at the 
very least, a political one).  
Standardized testing is undeniably useful, but as a sole measure of learning, 
it is inadequate. Nel Noddings, for instance, has maintained that genuine learning 
and achievement do not occur in settings that emphasize rigorous homogeneous 
standards. Noddings pioneered the concept of building schools around an “ethic of 
care” – of teaching students to develop skills in areas to which they are personally 
committed (Johnson and Reed 223). Noddings argues that school, in its current 
form, is not an environment in which “students learn to care for ideas” (Noddings 
qtd. in Johnson and Reed 226). Indeed, she says, students are not encouraged to 
care at all – whether for people, things, ideas, or themselves. Noddings points out 
 that not all students can learn all things; some students “will never understand the 
logic of a mathematical proof” (Noddings qtd. in Johnson and Reed 222). It is 
therefore the job of educators to ensure that students have the resources and 
freedom to pursue those subjects about which they feel most passionate. Teachers 
are not didactic instructors; rather, they are mediators and guides for curious 
students. They teach students how to learn and how to care. Duncan’s emphasis on 
standardized testing for students – and the more rigorous, standardized curriculum 
that would inevitably develop for pre-service teachers – will not allow students and 
teachers the freedom to explore the subjects they care about.  
Noddings raises important points about the necessity of individuation in 
student learning and curriculum design. Her ideas have basis in other philosophies. 
Most notably, John Dewey argued extensively in favor of a progressive, more 
individualized program of instruction in favor of a strictly didactic approach. 
Dewey’s social constructivist approach to education has dominated schools of 
education for the past fifty years. Dewey points out, quite reasonably, that 
education is not “an Either-Or affair” (Dewey qtd. in Johnson and Reed 124); the 
educator does not need to choose between the child and the curriculum. Rather, the 
well-trained teacher examines the needs of the child and then presents the material 
accordingly. But the presentation of content alone is not enough. In fact, he says   
…it is a mistake to suppose that the mere acquisition of 
a certain amount of arithmetic, geography, history, etc., 
which is taught and studied because it may be useful at 
some time in the future, has [a positive] effect, and it is 
a mistake to suppose that acquisition of skills in reading 
and figuring will automatically constitute preparation 
for their right and effective use under conditions very 
unlike those in which they were acquired (qtd in 
Johnson and Reed 126). 
Recognizing that nothing is educative in itself, Dewey explains that a subject is 
educative to the child only when it is presented in a developmentally appropriate 
manner and within an individually meaningful context. Indeed, “it is not enough 
that certain materials and methods have proved effective with other individuals at 
other times” (Dewey qtd. in Johnson and Reed 122). Rather, education grows 
organically between student and subject, in a way that does a disservice to neither 
the student nor the subject.  
Duncan’s suggestion that the quality of teachers and students can be 
measured – and his insistence that teachers rely on “proven” methods – is in direct 
opposition to Dewey’s very reasonable argument in favor of flexibility within the 
curriculum. In fact, Duncan’s selection of standardized testing as the major means 
 by which to measure student achievement necessarily narrows the definition of 
education. He argues that he is making an unbiased decision in favor of “student 
learning.” In fact, though, Duncan is clearly taking a political stand in favor of a 
standardized form of education – a form many teachers and thinkers would oppose.  
However, Duncan has the right to make political decisions – he is, after all, a 
politician – even if some disagree with his politics. Even if Duncan is less than 
upfront about his partiality, all politicians must make choices that reveal their 
political beliefs. Duncan believes that standardized tests, content-driven teacher 
education, and teacher residency programs are valuable assets to our country’s 
education program. Some theorists, like Dewey and Noddings, support a different 
system, and many others, such as Hirsch and Adler, would speak in favor his 
suggestion. As Secretary of Education, he is required to take a political stance and 
organize policies around that stance – and the result will always be somewhat 
polarizing.  
At the same time, though, Duncan’s stance in this case will negatively affect 
the quality and efficacy of education departments across the country. Education, 
while it is certainly tied to policy, is also an academic discipline, just like literature, 
astronomy, geology, and philosophy. As an academic discipline, education has a 
history: the ideas, theories, and philosophers that create the ongoing conversation 
about the subject. In order for a discipline to thrive as intellectually rigorous, 
though, it must not be policed. It must not be monitored to the extent that certain 
ideas are prohibited. Such prohibition drains a discipline of its intellectual 
lifeblood, which, for a practical discipline like education, will also have the very 
adverse effects on students and teachers that Duncan is trying so hard to avoid.  
For Duncan clearly does view ideas that conflict with his own as “subjective, 
obscure, [and] faddish…” He proclaims an allegiance to E.D. Hirsch, but Hirsch’s 
“acclaim” is slightly more contested than Duncan lets on. Theorists have argued 
that Hirsch has little classroom experience, having spent his life in the academy 
(Squire 77); Stephen Tchudi has likewise pointed out that Hirsch has not provided 
research suggesting that basic skills education is successful.   Yet in Duncan’s 
reformed school of education, the emphasis would be on student achievement and 
“rigorous” programs like E.D. Hirsch’s. These schools might even be assessed 
based on how well their teachers go on to teach students, which, again, would 
presumably be measured by standardized test scores. In essence, teachers would 
begin to learn to teach to the test – to protect the reputation of education 
departments, if for no other reason. In such teacher training programs, there may 
not be room for the voices of thinkers like Nel Noddings, A.S. Neill, Catherine 
Macaulay, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and countless other philosophers who have not 
necessarily developed “proven” instructional strategies. Yet these diverse voices, 
whether they are historical or contemporary, are nonetheless essential parts of any 
 educational curriculum; they allow for the creativity and knowledge that are 
necessary for genuine and authentically new reform to take place.  
Education policy-makers, for instance, have notoriously short memories 
(Early and Schneider 307). Teachers with years of experience can tell the stories of 
the “reforms” they have witnessed: this year an emphasis on basic skills; then, in 
reaction, a rally cry for progressivism; finally, a few years later, back to basics. If 
teachers, educational leaders, and policy-makers had a better understanding of the 
history of education and the myriad educational philosophies that have been 
developed and studied since antiquity, perhaps they would be less inclined to 
seesaw between the same two pedagogical mistakes year after year (Darling-
Hammond 344).  
Moreover, in any discipline, real reform – that is, the “revolutionary change” 
of which Duncan speaks – comes from the multiplicity of voices speaking at any 
given time, the sheer diversity of the conversation. There is no evidence that 
focusing on a single political ideology – liberal or conservative – has ever resulted 
in anything other than the stagnation of creative and inventive thought. Duncan 
wants educational reform, but he presumably wants to exclude from teacher 
education programs must ideological and philosophical classes. In a curriculum 
devoted to content and skills, is there room for ideas like those of Noddings and 
A.S. Neill? Is there room for philosophers such as Mary Wollstonecraft and 
Catherine Macaulay, when these thinkers have not developed methodologies that 
improve test scores? For Duncan, there does not seem to be. Yet educators cannot 
explore genuinely new possibilities for improving instruction unless there is a 
space for new, divergent thinking in departments of education. Educational 
philosophers, even those who have not developed specific curricula or immediately 
successful programs, can provide insight into the nature of human development, 
the mind, social organization, critical thinking, social justice, subject matter, and 
countless other important subjects in education – none of which Duncan values. 
Such myopic focus on standardization is not only a potential infringement on 
academic freedom; it may even stagnate educational thought and, as a result, limit 
possibilities for new ideas and revolutionary change.  
 Teachers need a clear vision of what they teach and why; policy-makers 
need access to a variety of ideas as they consider what might make successful 
reform possibilities; and academics and university students deserve the opportunity 
to learn not just what Duncan deems necessary, but what the discipline of 
education demands: sustained inquiry into a variety of ideologies and 
methodologies; the proposal and practice of new models; and the opportunity for 
genuine learning to take place at the level of the academy. As Duncan argues, 
schools of education should emphasize hands-on practice and frequent classroom 
visits and observations. But they should also continue to provide the pedagogical, 
 philosophical background in theory that Duncan dismisses. Once these theories are 
explored in context, they will acquire the meaning and relevance that they may 
currently lack. Such in-depth exploration of theory and practice may involve 
lengthening teacher training programs, many of which are no more than a year or 
two right now. The answer is not to remove theory from programs, but to combine 
theory and practice in a meaningful, lengthy, academic exploration of what it 
means to be a teacher.  
Arne Duncan is not misguided in his belief that teacher education programs 
need increased respect, rigor, and economic support. He is not wrong to say that 
pre-service teachers must know content and need to be exposed early and often to 
life in the classroom. But Duncan omits from teacher education the philosophical, 
academic side of education, and that is the flaw in his proposal. Education reform 
needs to emphasize the balance between rigorous standards and flexible, inquiry-
based methods. Only then will education remain a vital, intellectual experience at 
any level and for any person – teacher or student. 
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